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valid concerns, and it recognizes the importance for the ethical debate. In fact, a small portion of this paper is
devoted to these considerations. However, the majority of the paper focuses on empirical findings as they
relate to the supply of organ donations.
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Incentivizing Cadaver Organ Donors: 
How to Increase the Supply of Cadaver Organ 
Donors among Residents of Illinois 
Wesleyan University
Daniel Truesdale
I. Introduction
 Over 6,500 individuals died in 2012 waiting 
for an organ transplant in the United States. In the 
context of economics, this phenomenon is called a 
shortage, and in the world of the affected, this short-
age is the difference between life and death. Ever since 
the passage of the National Organ Transplant Act 
(NOTA), which prohibits the sale of organs for hu-
man transplantation, economists, philosophers, public 
policy experts, religious leaders, and others have 
debated the ethical and effective standing of the law.     
Increasing the supply of organs  by introducing 
monetary incentives to donors (suppliers) is a recent 
development in the field of economics. The concept 
has met resistance on ethical and empirical grounds.  
Regarding ethics, the use of monetary incentives has 
been criticized for potentially victimizing the poor, 
leading to the advancement of a black market, and 
removing the critical role of altruism within society. 
This paper does not undermine these valid concerns, 
and it recognizes the importance for the ethical de-
bate. In fact, a small portion of this paper is devoted 
to these considerations. However, the majority of the 
paper focuses on empirical findings as they relate to 
the supply of organ donations.
 The empirical debate regarding the use of 
monetary incentives to increase the supply of organs 
has faced unique challenges due to inadequacy of 
data. With the exception of Iran, China, and India, 
monetary payments for organs are illegal, leading to a 
limited quantity of data. As a result, discussion re-
garding the use of monetary incentives to increase the 
supply of organs has remained theoretical. This paper 
examines the impact of monetary incentives with 
regards to organ supply in an empirical context. The 
paper develops the research in the following format;  
Section II provides a literature review on previous 
scholarly endeavors regarding the use of monetary 
incentives to increase the supply of organs,  Section 
III elaborates on the theoretical model utilized in the 
research, Section IV restates the research question and 
provides a stated hypothesis, Section V analyzes the 
significance of the $30 incentive, Section VI elaborates 
on the empirical model and if willingness to accept 
the $30 fee waiver differs across individuals with dif-
ferent demographic characteristics, Section VII delib-
erates ethical considerations, and Section VIII delivers 
a conclusion along with policy ramifications.
II. Literature Review
A. Titmuss and Arrow
 As previously mentioned, the debate sur-
rounding the use of monetary incentives to increase 
the supply of organs has remained in the theoretical 
realm. Richard Titmuss (1971) was the first economist 
to entertain the idea of offering monetary compensa-
tion for human tissue. Titmuss argued that monetary 
incentives for organs would lead to market failure. 
In particular, Titmuss saw monetary compensation, 
specifically in blood procurement, as a health risk due 
to the inclination of unhealthy individuals to partake 
in the market. As Thorne restates Titmuss’s argument, 
“One might infer that, in the absence of effective tests 
for diseases like hepatitis, donated blood is of bet-
ter quality because donors who are not paid for their 
blood have no incentive to conceal their illnesses” 
(Thorne, 2006, p. 1,342). In other words, offering 
monetary incentives degrades the quality of blood 
since unhealthy individuals, who before were not en-
ticed to donate out of altruism, now maintain a mon-
etary incentive to partake in the market. Thus, they 
subject both donors and recipients to health risks.
Furthermore, Titmuss argued monetary incentives for 
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human tissue would cause the number of altruistic 
donations to wither thereby causing the net supply of 
organs to decrease (Titmuss, 1971) since an altruistic 
market and a monetary market could not coexist.  
This axiom was founded on Titmuss’s assertion that 
monetary markets deny individuals “the right to give” 
(1971). Another economist, K.J. Arrow, fundamen-
tally disagreed with Titmuss and questioned, “Why 
should it be that the creation of a market in blood 
would decrease the altruism embodied in giving 
blood? I do not find any clear answers in Titmuss’” 
(Arrow, 1972, p.350).
 According to Arrow, altruistic and non-
altruistic individuals respond to different incentives. 
Arrow’s model proposes altruistic donors respond to 
exhortation, and non-altruistic individuals respond 
to monetary incentives. Since the two distinct sup-
pliers respond to unique incentives, neither subset is 
impacted by the introduction of an alternate incen-
tive. 
 Extended studies have investigated the debate 
between Arrow and Titmuss. Leider and Roth’s re-
search examined Americans’ approval or disapproval 
of a monetary market for organs. They concluded a 
majority of Americans approve of a kidney market, 
especially when the market is regulated by a third 
party, specifically the government (2010). This con-
clusion casts doubt on Titmuss’s concern of a mon-
etary market withering away altruistic donations . 
B. Case Studies
As previously mentioned, the absence of data regard-
ing the use of monetary incentives to increase the 
supply of organs presents analytical issues. Although 
there are few reliable studies that investigate the use 
of monetary incentives, there are close approxima-
tions which offer limited insight. For instance, Ash-
kenazi, Stoler, Cohen, and Beyar (2013) investigated 
The Brain-Respiratory Death Law and The Organ 
Transplantation Law, and how the two laws have 
provided additional organs for the state of Israel. 
The latter implemented penalties for individuals 
who travelled internationally to receive an organ and 
were then later reimbursed by insurance companies 
for such transactions. In addition, the law works to 
remove disincentives which previous organ donors 
encountered; (a) earnings loss reimbursement of 40 
days based on the donor’s average income during the 
three months prior to donation, (b) a fixed transpor-
tation refund to cover commuting costs, (c) reim-
bursement for seven days during recovery, (d) five 
years reimbursement of medical, work capability loss 
and insurances, (e) reimbursement of five psychologi-
cal consultations and treatments. 
 The removal of these disincentives is con-
nected to increasing the supply of organs in Israel.  
“Compared to previous years, in 2011 there was a sig-
nificant increase in the number of deceased organ do-
nors directly related to an increase in organ donation 
rate (from 7.8 to 11.4 donors per million population), 
in parallel to a significant increase in the number of 
new registered donors” (Lavee, 2013, p. 780). While 
the aforementioned are removal of disincentives, the 
implementation of incentives is a similar, if not iden-
tical, concept. 
 A pseudo-incentivized program was utilized 
in the state of Georgia until the year 2005. “Until 
recently, the state of Georgia offered a $7 discount 
on driver’s license registration fees to individuals 
who registered as organ donors. The discount was 
scrapped in 2005 as part of an overhaul of the driver’s 
license registration system. But in 2005, Georgia had 
one of the highest registration rates for organ do-
nation in the country” (Howard, 2007, p. 30).  The 
program utilized in Georgia gives contextual support 
suggesting monetary payment could increase the sup-
ply of organs.
C. Socio-demographics
 Scholars have researched how socio-demo-
graphic characteristics could impact the supply of 
organ donations among different subsets of a citi-
zenry. The most substantial argument against the use 
of monetary incentives is the concern of victimizing 
the poor. According to Nancy Scheper-Hughes, an 
anthropologist who tracks global trade of human or-
gans, “the movement and flow of living donor organs 
-mostly kidneys- is from South to North, from poor 
to rich, from black and brown to white, and from 
female to male bodies” (Satel, 2008, p. 59). Further-
more, a Washington Post journalist declared “com-
pensation for organs might exacerbate the differences 
[between rich and poor] turning the poor into surgi-
cal ward slaves or feudal donors for the rich” (Satel, 
2008, p. 59).  Note the aforementioned concerns are 
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in regard to living organ donations. This study in-
tends to investigate the use of monetary incentives 
to increase the supply of cadaver organ donations. 
Although an ethical concern still exists, the degree of 
sensitivity is reduced with cadaver organ donations.
In addition to socioeconomic status, Satel investigat-
ed different religious groups’ tolerance towards com-
pensating organ donors. Focusing on Judaism, Islam, 
and Catholicism, Satel argues Judaism is the most 
receptive to a market for organs with Catholicism be-
ing the most resistant. As she states for Judaism, 
“Many Jewish scholars accept the idea of rewarding 
people for donating organs for transplantation. Rabbi 
Shlomo Goren, the third Ashkenazi chief rabbi of Is-
rael, writes that ‘the donation of a kidney in consider-
ation of financial reward does not change its positive 
characteristic’” (Satel, 2008, p. 158).
 In regards to Islam, Satel acknowledges 
the complexity within the religion. She notes most 
Islamic scholars condemn the sale of organs because 
Allah is believed to own the human body. Therefore, 
humans are not granted the right to sell organs they 
technically do not possess.  However, Satel uncovered 
that a majority of Muslim scholars approve of such 
transactions, if the alternative is death. Satel noted, 
“For example, a survey of thirty-two Muslim scholars 
found uniform agreement that organ trading is not 
permissible, yet 68.7 percent of them made an excep-
tion if the only alternative was death” (Satel, 2008, 
p. 159). Although this exception varies throughout 
the religion, there exists a strong presence within the 
faith of Islam to tolerate monetary compensation for 
organ donations, specifically when confronted with 
death.
 Catholicism, according to Satel, is the most 
resistant to a monetary market for organs. Although 
individual leaders and scholars within the religion 
have made attempts to humanize the monetary mar-
ket, the overall temperance of the Catholic Church 
towards a market-based system is negative. 
“The Catholic consensus position endorses Pope John 
Paul II’s opposition to the commercialization of hu-
man organs. The United States Conference of Catho-
lic Bishops issued a directive asserting that living 
donor transplantation is acceptable, ‘but economic 
advantages should not accrue to the donor.’ The Na-
tional Catholic Bioethics Center has stated the posi-
tion even more forcefully, saying it ‘strongly opposes 
any regulated market for organ sales’” (Satel, 2008, p. 
162).
As a result, Satel concludes Judaism is the most recep-
tive towards a monetary market for organs, while the 
Catholic faith is the most resistant. 
D. Recent Endeavors
 The following studies extend from the as-
sumption that monetary incentives can be utilized to 
increase the supply of organs. Specifically, the follow-
ing authors investigated the market equilibrium price, 
which would be needed to remove the organ shortage 
among living donors. Becker and Elias utilized esti-
mated values to predict the cost of kidneys and livers. 
They concluded “that monetary incentives could in-
crease the supply of organs for transplant sufficiently 
to eliminate the large queues in the organ market, 
and it would do so while increasing the overall cost 
of transplant surgery by no more than 12%”(Becker 
and Elias, 2007 p. 3). They estimated the cost of living 
kidneys and livers by “computing how much addi-
tional income or market consumption an individual 
will require to be indifferent between selling an organ 
or not” (Becker and Elias, 2007, p. 9). Thus, con-
cluding the average cost for a kidney and liver were 
$160,000 and $335,000 respectively. However, these 
figures include the entire cost of the procedure, which 
means the aforementioned is both the price of the 
organ and the cost of the operation. In addition, the 
authors relied on estimated values and utilized inter-
national comparisons with Iran and India to compute 
the aggregate cost. 
 One potential downfall in utilizing interna-
tional comparisons is that it subjects the researcher to 
national norms, which are not universal. For instance, 
the Iranian government has outlawed monetary 
compensation for cadaver organs on the grounds that 
it violates the Koran. Although an admirable attempt, 
utilizing estimates and international comparisons to 
compute market price equilibrium for living organs 
subjects the researcher to cultural variation in the 
data.
 Professor Frank Adams (1999) utilized a sur-
vey design method to investigate the market clearing 
price needed to eliminate a market shortage. Adams 
gathered original data from 392 students attending 
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Auburn University. The survey contained 20 ques-
tions ranging from demographic enquiries to ques-
tions regarding an individual’s payment of schedule 
for living organs. Essentially, students were asked at 
what price they would be willing to sell their organs.  
Professor Adams concluded the market clearing price 
for kidneys and liver organs is $1,000. However, a 
bias exists in Adams’s research because the surveyed 
sample is not representative of the entire population. 
College students tend to be more liberal with regard 
to organ donation when compared to the entire pop-
ulation, which may cause the market clearing price 
predicted by Adams to be artificially low. Professor 
Adams’s work, along with Howard’s, illustrates the de-
gree of difficulty in computing a market equilibrium 
price for organs due to an inadequate amount of data.
Despite empirical fallacies, Thorne acknowledges that 
a vast majority of economists recognize the absence 
of a market has led to a quantity shortage. “What 
economists agree on nearly universally is that the ban 
on an organ market must necessarily cause shortages 
and other inefficiencies” (Thorne, 2006, p. 1,341).
E. Illinois Driver’s License Fee and Definitions
Currently in Illinois, persons 21-60 years of age must 
pay a $30 fee when they receive and/or renew their 
driver’s license (Illinois Department of Motor Vehi-
cles).This paper examines the possibility that waiving 
the $30 fee with the intention to entice organ dona-
tion will change a significant portion of non-donors 
into donors.
III. Theory
      The theoretical construct for this research 
is based on the Pindyck and Rubinfeld supply and 
demand model. The model theorizes that an increase 
in the price of an organ should increase the quantity 
supplied. The Pindyck and Rubinfeld model contains 
the following assumptions:  (a) the quality of the 
organs will be the same whether sold or donated, (b) 
altruists will continue to donate even after a market is 
introduced (Note: this directly contradicts Titmuss), 
(c) when markets are banned, not only is the cost 
of the good zero, but no other costs are required to 
procure the donated good, (d) nothing can be done 
to increase the supply of organs when markets are 
banned (Pindyck and Rubinfeld,1989). 
 The above-mentioned assumptions have re-
ceived criticism from Titmuss, specifically regarding 
the assertion that altruistic donations will exist after 
the introduction of monetary incentives and that the 
quality of the organs will remain constant. As Tit-
muss expressed in the blood procurement example, 
the quality of the good may deteriorate in the market, 
since individuals now have an incentive to hide any 
deficiencies. Second, the model assumes there are no 
costs associated with altruistic organ donations.  The 
model also treats individuals on a dichotomous scale; 
either as altruistic or non-altruistic. There is reason 
to believe the introduction of monetary incentives 
might turn altruistic donors into non-altruistic indi-
viduals. Even though the overall number of cadaver 
organs might increase, the quantity of altruistic do-
nors could wither. Despite the criticisms, this paper 
will use the theoretical construct of the Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld model. 
 This research makes alterations to the Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld model. Specifically for the residents of 
Illinois, this paper will investigate the effectiveness of 
waiving a $30 driver’s license fee. Although a similar 
concept to a payment of schedules, the incentivized 
program is unique. For one, respondents are trading 
a future commodity, which carries a level of uncer-
tainty with regards to the transaction.   In addition, 
unlike the payment of schedules system utilized by 
Adams, the incentive program is “take it or leave it.” 
Respondents only have one avenue to sell their cadav-
er organs and it is through the Illinois Department 
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) . Future research might 
wish to explore how a specific incentivize program, 
such as the one presented in this paper, compares to 
an unregulated market where individuals are able to 
negotiate the price of their cadaver organs. However, 
this research only examines the effectiveness of the 
$30 incentive.
 
 Finally, the model utilized in this research 
will alter the demand curve for organs. The Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld model assumes demand for organs is 
neither perfectly elastic nor inelastic (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1989); however this paper assumes perfect 
inelasticity for organs demanded. This assumption is 
shared with Adams. Assuming a perfectly inelastic 
demand curve will simplify any empirical findings.  
Graph 1 provides the theoretical model.
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IV. Hypothesis and Research Question
 This paper examines the impact of monetary 
incentives on cadaver organ supply. Using original 
data, collected from a survey design method, this 
paper investigates the following questions; 1) Will a 
specific incentivized program, for instance a waiver of 
a driver’s license fee for $30, increase the supply of ca-
daver organs in Illinois? And, 2) Are individuals from 
certain socio-demographics more likely to respond to 
the $30 incentive? This paper makes the following hy-
potheses: ceteris paribus (a) the incentive of the $30 
fee waiver for Illinois residents will increase the sup-
ply of cadaver organs significantly, among students 
at Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU) and (b) this 
response is constant across all socio-demographic 
groups.
V. Data
 Empirical data regarding the use of monetary 
incentives to increase the supply of organs is nonexis-
tent, except in China, India, and Iran. For this reason, 
this research relied on a survey design method to 
collect original data.  An IRB approved, online survey 
was randomly administered to students at Illinois 
Wesleyan University (IWU). The students had from 
September 1, 2014 to October 20, 2014 to complete 
the online survey. Overall, 156 students partook in 
the survey and 130 student responses were utilized in 
this research. The remaining 26 were removed since 
these respondents did not possess an Illinois driver’s 
license, and therefore could not be enticed by the $30 
fee waiver.
 The method utilized in this research is similar 
to the one employed by Adams when he surveyed 
students attending Auburn University. Similar to 
Adams, there is a bias in utilizing college students 
as the sample. Students attending universities are 
younger compared to the general population and 
typically display liberal attitudes towards organ dona-
tion, surely unrepresentative of the entire population. 
This research differs from Professor Adams, because 
it investigates monetary incentives as they relate to 
increasing the supply of cadaver organs, rather than 
living organs. In addition, this research investigates 
the effectiveness of a specialized incentivized pro-
gram, a take-it or leave-it mechanism.
 There are two reasons for studying the phe-
nomenon in this context. First, there exists a lack of 
empirical data regarding the use of monetary incen-
tives to increase the supply of cadaver organs in the 
realm of economics, thus allowing this research to 
add substantial knowledge to the discipline. Second, 
utilizing monetary incentives to acquire living organs 
entails policy and ethical ramifications, which are 
beyond the scope of this study. This paper recognizes 
there are policy complications for cadaver organs, but 
such concerns are not the focus of this paper and are 
not as substantial.
 In addition, the survey for this research was 
designed to study the impact of a particular incentiv-
ized program: the $30 driver’s license fee waiver. The 
respondents were grouped based on specific answers 
during the survey. First, respondents were separated 
into two subsets; those possessing an Illinois driver’s 
license and those not possessing an Illinois driver’s 
license. Next, respondents were asked if they were 
cadaver organ donors. Depending on their response, 
respondents from both subsets were asked slightly 
different questions. Respondents with an Illinois 
driver’s license and who were already cadaver organ 
donors were asked, 
“In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30 fee when 
they get their driver’s license. With this in mind, if the 
Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles was to waive 
your fee, only if you became an organ donor, would 
you have been more enticed to become an organ 
donor in order to cancel the $30 fee?”
Likewise, Illinois respondents who were not already 
cadaver organ donors were asked,  
“In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30 fee when 
they get their driver’s license. With this in mind, if the 
Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles was to waive 
your fee, only if you became an organ donor, would 
you then become an organ donor to cancel the $30 
fee?” 
 These questions allow the effectiveness of 
an incentive program, such as the $30 fee waiver, 
to be examined. The primary focus of this paper is 
to investigate the effectiveness of the $30 waiver for 
non-organ donors. A completed reproduction of the 
survey is located in the Appendix.
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the null hypothesis that the difference in gender 
proportions to be a cadaver organ donor is insignifi-
cant. The same procedure is utilized to discern if a 
difference exists among different religious groups and 
probability of being an organ donor. The table below 
explores the phenomenon. From Table 7, there exists 
no significant difference between religious affiliation 
and likelihood of being a cadaver organ donor.
 After discovering insignificant differences in 
the likelihood of being a cadaver organ donor among 
gender and different religious groups, this paper 
investigates if the $30 incentive can have a significant 
impact in increasing organ donors among the differ-
ent subsets. Before analyzing the significance of the 
incentivized program, descriptive data alludes the 
raw change in number when the monetary incentive 
is presented. According to Table 8, both men and 
women were responsive to the $30 incentive. Table 8 
provides a summary.
 When examining different religions, it ap-
pears Catholics, Protestants, and the “other” catego-
ries were enticed by the $30 incentive. Surprisingly, 
Catholics are also quite likely to respond to the incen-
tive, which contradicts earlier assumptions made in 
the literature review.
 To test if the $30 incentive has a significant 
impact amongst the different subsets, this paper 
utilizes a one sample t-test, as the same sample of re-
spondents is studied before and after the introduction 
of the stimuli. This research is testing the hypothesis 
that there is not a statistical difference in the propor-
tion of “yes” responses before the introduction of the 
$30 stimuli and after the stimuli is presented, utilizing 
the identical sample. An additional cause for utiliz-
ing a one sample t-test compared to a two sample 
t-test is because the number of cadaver organ donors 
is expected to increase once the monetary incentive 
is offered. This is an inference grounded in previ-
ous theoretical frameworks.  Table 10 provides data 
indicating whether the $30 incentive had a significant 
impact on population as a whole whereas Table 11 
looks at the individual subsets.   
 Column 1 indicates which subset is being 
studied and the number in parentheses under the 
name indicates the total number of individuals in the 
A. Summary Data
 The following provides summary statistics 
from the survey administered to the IWU student 
population. Table 1 provides insight into the total 
number of individuals possessing an Illinois Driver’s 
license and the distribution of cadaver organ donors 
and non-donors. Table 2 provides a summary de-
scription of gender and Table 3 provides summary 
data for different religious affiliations across the 
sample.
 This paper investigates how to entice the indi-
viduals who are not already organ donors (57 indi-
viduals) to become donors. This analysis is furthered 
by analyzing subsets of the IWU student population. 
For instance, among the 50 men from the survey, 50% 
(25) are already organ donors, while 50% (25) are 
not. Among 81 women, 60.5% (49) are already organ 
donors, while 39.5% (32) are not. From observing 
Table 4, women are more likely to be organ donors 
compared to men.
 The number of organ donors across religious 
affiliations appears to differ. Recall from the litera-
ture review, Catholics are the most resistant to be-
ing organ donors. However, the survey data for this 
study illustrates the “other” category as being the 
most resistant. Although, the differences between the 
three religious subsets in terms of organ donation 
are small, it appears Protestants are most likely to be 
organ donors, while Catholics are the second most 
likely. The “other” category consists of other major 
religions as well as individuals not identifying with a 
major religion. This lack of distinction makes it dif-
ficult to analyze the results from the “other” subset. 
The results are shown in Table 5.
VI. Significance Tests
 As is evident from the summary statistics, 
differences exist across gender and religious groups 
in regards to organ donation. This section utilizes a 
two-sample t-test to distinguish if such differences 
between the subsets are statistically significant. The 
null hypothesis states the difference between the two 
proportions is equal to “0”, and is thus insignificant. 
The alternate hypothesis proclaims the difference in 
proportions of the two subsets is statistically signifi-
cant. Table 6 displays the results for gender. Since the 
p-value is greater than 0.05 this paper fails to reject 
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specific subset. Column 2 presents the total num-
ber of individuals from the specific subsets who are 
already cadaver organ donors before the introduc-
tion of the $30 incentive. Both the percentage and 
the raw number are included. Column 3 contains the 
new percentage of individuals who become organ 
donors due to the introduction of the $30 incentive. 
The equation below the percentage is the equation 
utilized to obtain the new raw number of cadaver 
organ donors. The bolded number indicates the value 
being added to the original. Utilizing a one-sample 
t-test, Column 4 tests to see if the difference between 
the original proportion and the new proportion of 
cadaver organ donors is significant.  Recall, the null 
hypothesis claims the difference between the two pro-
portions is insignificant, while the alternative hypoth-
esis states the difference in proportions is significant.
Column 5 takes the total number from Column 3 and 
adds half of the respondents who indicated a maybe 
(uncertain) to becoming an organ donor due to the 
introduction of the $30 incentive. Column 6 tests to 
see if the difference from the original proportion and 
the new proportion is significant. The reason for add-
ing half of the respondents who indicated maybe is 
grounded in the belief that some of these individuals 
only require additional information in order to in-
duce them to become organ donors. Remember, the 
individuals from the maybe category were once a no 
to being a cadaver organ donor, but after the intro-
duction of the monetary incentive they switched to 
a maybe. The following section examines the signifi-
cance among the entire sample of respondents who 
were not cadaver organ donors.
 It appears when analyzing the population as 
a whole; the $30 dollar incentive is first significant at 
the 95% confidence interval level when only includ-
ing respondents who indicated yes to the $30 dollar 
incentive and comparing the new percentage of organ 
donors with the original percentage. When half of 
the respondents who were uncertain about becoming 
organ donors from the $30 incentive are included, 
the difference in the percentage is significant at the 
99% confidence interval level. This result supports 
the hypothesis that the $30 dollar incentive program 
has a significant impact on increasing the proportion 
of organ donations. This is critical to the research 
because it supports the idea that the $30 incentive 
can have a significant impact in increasing the overall 
number of cadaver organ donors. Although this data 
set is only cross-sectional and utilizes a small sample, 
this finding gives positive empirical evidence that a 
small monetary incentive can increase the proportion 
of organ donors among a population, in this case the 
students of IWU.
 Next, the research investigated if differences 
existed across demographics in likelihood to respond 
to the $30 incentive. The procedure utilized in Table 
11 is identical to the procedure used in Table 10. The 
results are presented in the Appendix. The results 
presented in the table are competing. For men, the in-
troduction of the $30 dollar incentive was significant 
at the 90% confidence interval when adding just the 
yes group and remained significant at this level when 
including half of the maybe respondents. For women, 
the $30 incentive was significant first at the 90% con-
fidence interval when only adding the yes group but 
then became significant at the 95% confidence in-
terval when half of the maybes were added.  Among 
Catholics, the increase in proportion was not signifi-
cant when only observing the increase in proportion 
from the yes’s but then became significant at the 90% 
confidence interval when half of the maybe’s were 
added. Among Protestants, the increase in propor-
tion of organ donors was insignificant both for when 
only the yes’s were added and when half of the may-
bes were added. Finally, among respondents from the 
“other” religious category, the increase in proportion 
was significant at the 90% confidence interval, both 
for when only the yes’s were added and when half of 
the maybes were added to the total.
VII. Multivariate Empirical Model
 Due to the exploratory nature of this research 
and the relatively low number of cases collected from 
the survey, executing an empirical model was a dif-
ficult task. Even still, examining whether different 
demographic characteristics impact a respondent’s 
probability of accepting the $30 monetary incen-
tive was tested.  This section of the paper explores 
if willingness to accept the $30 monetary incentive 
is impacted by socio-demographic factors includ-
ing gender, religious affiliation, and knowledge of an 
individual on dialysis.
 The first two independent variables are self-
explanatory, but the third requires clarification. The 
reason for including a measurement indicating if a re-
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spondent knows an individual on dialysis is the belief 
that knowing someone on dialysis creates sympathy 
to the cause, increasing the likelihood of accepting 
the $30 incentive. Table 12 provides information re-
garding the regression. Since the dependent measure-
ment, accepting the $30 incentive and becoming an 
organ donor, is dichotomous in nature, this research 
utilized a binary logistic regression to test if the in-
dependent variables have a significant impact on the 
dependent variable.
 The results from Regression One are located 
in Table 13. When all the independent variables were 
observed in concert with each other (Column 1), it 
appeared neither variable was significant. This may 
be a result of the low number of cases present in the 
survey sample. Columns 2 through 4 investigate if 
each independent variable in isolation may have a 
significant impact on increasing organ donations. 
Again, all the independent variables in isolation were 
insignificant. However, KNOWLEDGE_OF_DIALY-
SIS appeared to be the closest in significance. Again, 
the independent variable is insignificant but perhaps 
a larger sample size would support the theory that 
knowing someone who is suffering through kidney 
dialysis creates sympathy for the cause, thereby mak-
ing them more benevolent to accept the $30 incen-
tive.
VIII. Ethical Considerations
 Although this paper analyzed the positive 
significance of the $30 incentive program, it would be 
incomplete if it did not mention the normative aspect 
of incentivizing organ donations. This section does 
not display an exhaustive list of ethical concerns re-
garding the sensitive issue, but instead highlights only 
a few. In her work, When Altruism Isn’t Enough, Satel 
(2008) enumerates on the concerns of compensat-
ing living organ donors. Although her topic of focus 
is living organ donations, some of the arguments are 
transferable to the cadaver organ debate.  As Satel re-
cords, those opposed to compensating organ donors 
embody the moral stance against treating the body 
like a commodity. Although a noble stance, Satel 
argues society should reward individuals for noble 
behavior. She relates the concept of paying soldiers 
for donating their bodies and livelihood in war time 
and states it would be irrational not to pay soldiers 
(and policemen and firemen for that matter) for their 
work and sacrifice. Are they not sacrificing their bod-
ies, and are we therefore not using their bodies like 
a commodity? These ideas put forth by Satel offers a 
unique insight.
 The second argument stems from the idea 
that compensating individuals will inherently lead to 
a black market. Satel (2008) argues it is the absence 
of a regulated, legal market, that there exists a black 
market. The quantity shortage of organs has forced 
individuals to face an ultimatum, either suffer or 
obtain an illegal organ. If compensating organ donors 
can eliminate this market shortage, does it not reason 
that this should eliminate, not proliferate, a black 
market?
 Again, this section was not intended to an-
swer all of the ethical concerns, but instead offer an 
alternate view for those concerned with the norma-
tive analysis of compensating organ donations. No 
matter how strong the empirical standing, ultimately 
this policy will require political will and therefore 
needs to address normative concerns.
IX. Conclusion
 Overall, the findings in this paper are sub-
stantial. Most notably, discovering the $30 incentive 
increases the proportion of organ donors on the cam-
pus of IWU is significant. This leads to the conclusion 
that among college students, a small monetary incen-
tive can entice non-organ donors to become cadaver 
donors.  Therefore, the results support the original 
hypothesis. 
 However, this paper was unable to discover 
if willingness to accept the monetary incentive was 
impacted by socio-demographics. Future research 
may wish to explore how the independent variables, 
gender, age, income, marital status, race, religion, etc., 
may impact the willingness to accept the monetary 
incentive.
 A limitation of this research was that it was 
confined to the borders of IWU’s campus. The next 
step in this research process is to investigate whether 
a small monetary incentive program, such as the $30 
license fee waiver, has an impact on a larger group 
of individuals. I intend to continue this research and 
survey the City of Bloomington, Illinois. By surveying 
a city’s entire population, the sample will be subject to 
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greater variance in marital status, income, religion, as 
well as other independent measures not captured on 
a college campus. These new measures will add valid-
ity to the model.
 Discovering that a small incentive program 
entices citizens to become cadaver organ donors has 
the potential to save lives. This paper kindled the dis-
cussion of how 6,500 individuals died in 2012 due to 
an organ shortage. If $30 could have a significant im-
pact in reducing the amount of these deaths, would it 
not be worth it to implement such a program? Obvi-
ously, before exerting the findings of this paper to the 
entire population, further research needs to investi-
gate whether the $30 incentive is effective outside the 
campus of IWU. The findings in this paper are but 
a stepping stone to greater discoveries that have the 
potential to save lives.
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Appendix
A. Online Survey
Monetary Market for Organ Donation
 You are invited to be a participant in a re-
search study about monetary markets for organs. You 
were selected as a possible participant because you 
are enrolled at Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU). 
We ask that you read this document and ask any 
questions you may have before agreeing to be in the 
study. The study is being conducted by student Daniel 
Truesdale and Professor Craig Broadbent of Illinois 
Wesleyan University.
 The purpose of this study is to examine if 
monetary incentives could be utilized to increase the 
supply of cadaver organs. The length of time you will 
be involved with this study is approximately 30 min-
utes, you will be asked to complete a survey.
 If you agree to participate, we will ask you to 
complete a list of questions from an online survey.
The records of this study will be kept private. The data 
will be anonymous and only Professor Broadbent and 
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Daniel Truesdale will have access to the data. Any 
sort of report that is published or presentation that is 
given, will not include any individual specific infor-
mation.
 Your participation in this study is voluntary. 
Your decision whether or not to participate will not 
affect your current or future relations with Illinois 
Wesleyan University or any of its representatives. You 
have the right to refuse to participate or to withdraw 
at any time without penalty or loss of benefits
At this time, you may ask any questions you have 
about this study or about the informed consent pro-
cess. If you have questions later, you may contact the 
researcher(s) at dtruesda@iwu.edu.
 If you have questions or concerns regard-
ing this study and would like to speak with someone 
other than the researcher(s), you may contact Dr. 
Brian Brennan, Institutional Review Board Chair, Il-
linois Wesleyan University, at 309-556-3972, 
bbrenna1@iwu.edu.
 If you would like a copy of this form for your 
records please contact Daniel Truesdale and a form 
will be emailed to you.
 I have read and understood the above expla-
nations, and my questions have been addressed. The 
information that I provide will be used for research 
purposes only. I understand that my participation is 
voluntary and that I may withdraw anytime without 
penalty. If I have any concerns about my experi-
ence in this study (e.g., that I was treated unfairly 
or felt unnecessarily threatened), I may contact the 
researchers or the Chair of the IWU Institutional 
Review Board regarding my concerns. I voluntarily 
consent to participate in this research study. (By 
clicking “Yes” and advancing to next page, you agree 
to the study).
Do you wish to participate in the online survey?
o   Yes
o   No
Information on Organ Donation
 There is an enormous need for organ donors 
throughout the United States. In 2012, more than 
6,500 people died waiting for an organ transplant. 
How Cadaver Organ Donation Works: All lifesaving 
efforts are made to save a person’s life without regard 
to their status as an organ/tissue donor. It is only after 
these efforts have failed and someone is declared dead 
that recovery efforts begin. The staff at the hospital, 
for which the individual is deceased, is not involved 
with the recovery process and does not have access to 
the Secretary of State Organ/Tissue Donor Registry. 
When death occurs or is imminent, the hospital staff 
contacts the organ procurement organization (OPO) 
to report the death. The OPO sends clinical staff to 
the hospital if it is likely that donation is possible. The 
OPO contacts the Secretary of State’s donor registry 
hotline to find out if the person is listed in the regis-
try. If the person is in the registry, the trained OPO 
staff will work with the family, explaining the process, 
gathering information and provide support. If he/she 
is not in the registry, family will be educated about 
the process and asked for consent to donate. Each 
potential donor is evaluated to see what organs/tissue 
can be recovered for transplantation. The number of 
organs/tissue recovered varies from person to per-
son. The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) 
manages the list of patients waiting for transplants. 
A computer program matches donor organs with 
recipients based on certain matching criteria such 
as blood and tissue type, height and weight, as well 
as how sick the patient is, how long they have been 
waiting and distance from donor to patient. About 75 
percent of all organs go to local patients. Recovery is 
a surgical procedure where the donor is treated with 
dignity and respect, and the body restored to allow 
for an open-casket visitation. All funeral and burial 
or cremation options may take place after donation. 
In order to register as an organ donor in Illinois, you 
must be at least 18 years old. **If you are younger 
than 18 years old, your parents, next of kin, or le-
gal guardians have the responsibility of making the 
decision about organ donation. When an individual 
registers, the organ donor registry will carry out their 
wish to donate your organs and tissues upon your 
death. The individual’s family will NOT have to pay 
any amount for the removal of your organs. Although 
everyone is eligible for organ donation (regardless of 
age, race, or medical history), medical professionals 
make determinations whether the organs are suitable 
for transplant once an organ donor has deceased. 
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Below is a list of the top myths regarding organ dona-
tion: 
 Doctors do not work with the same urgency 
to save an individual’s life if they know their an organ 
donor: Many people are concerned that if they sign 
up to be an organ donor, they won’t get the same level 
of care should they end up in a life or death situation. 
However, this is not true. Your doctor is obligated to 
have one singular aim: to save your life. 
 If you are a registered donor, a doctor might 
declare you dead before it’s appropriate: This is a 
common myth that scares many people out of reg-
istering to donate. However, the opposite is actually 
true. Organ donors are given more tests to determine 
official death than those patients who haven’t agreed 
to organ donation. 
 Doctors will take all of your organs, even if 
you only want to donate one: You can specify which 
organs you are willing to donate. Only the organ(s) 
you identify will be donated. Organs are sold on the 
black market: There are many urban legends involv-
ing frightening tales of organs being stolen and sold 
for profit. 
 The process of donation is so complex and 
medically involved that this is not viable in the U.S. 
A transplant necessitates all of the following: Highly 
trained doctors, modern healthcare facilities, match-
ing of donors to recipients, other medical support. 
 We would like to ask a few questions about 
you before we proceed to questions about organ do-
nation.
All Questions
Year you were born
Race
o   African American/African/Black/Caribbean
o   Asian/Pacific Islander
o   Caucasian (Non Hispanic)
o   Hispanic/Latino
o   Native American
o   Prefer not to answer
Are you married?
o   Yes
o   No
o   Prefer not to answer
Gender
o   Male
o   Female
o   Prefer not to answer
How many people, besides yourself, live in your 
household?
o   0
o   1
o   2
o   3
o   4
o   5
o   More than 5
What is your personal aggregate annual income?
*Include income from all external factors: (Parents, 
Guardians, Scholarships, Part-Time Job, etc.)
o   Less than $10,000
o   $10,000-$29,999
o   $30,000-$49,999
o   $50,000-$99,999
o   $100,000-$249,000
o   $250,000 or more
Are you a member of an organized religion?
o   Yes
o   No
o   Prefer not to answer
If yes, which organized religion are you a member of?
o   Protestant/Other Christian
o   Catholic
o   Mormon
o   Jewish
o   Muslim
o   Other non-Christian religion
o   Prefer not to answer
o   Not Applicable
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Organ Donation Questions
Do you know of a friend or relative who is on dialy-
sis?
o   Yes
o   No
o   Prefer not to answer
Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever 
been a organ donor?
o   Yes
o   No
o   Prefer not to answer
Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever 
been a recipient of donor organs?
o   Yes
o   No
o   Prefer not to answer
Would you be offended by the purchase and sale of 
cadaver organs, even if such transaction saved lives?
o   Yes
o   No
o   Do not know
Would you be offended by a government program 
which would allow your organs to be removed at 
death without your explicit permission?
o   Yes
o   No
o   Do not know
If yes, would you still be offended by a governmental 
policy which would allow your organs to be removed 
at death without your explicit permission, even if you 
could prevent such removal by prefiling, prior to your 
death, a statement denying such permission?
o   Yes
o   No
o   Do not know
Which organs would you be willing to donate after 
you are deceased?
*Select “All” if you would donate all your organs
o   Heart
o   Lungs
o   Liver
o   Pancreas
o   Kidneys
o   Small Intestines
o   All
Which organs would you not be willing to donate 
after you are deceased?
*Select “All” if you would not donate any of your 
organs
o   Heart
o   Lungs
o   Liver
o   Pancreas
o   Kidneys
o   Small Intestines
o   All
Do you have a Illinois driver’s license?
o   Yes
o   No
o   Prefer not to answer
If yes to the last question, then the respondents fol-
lowed this track: 
Monetary Market for Organ Donation
Illinois Questions
 If yes, do you know you can become a ca-
daveric organ donor through your driver’s license by 
joining the First-Person Consent Organ/Tissue Do-
nor Registry by submitting a form online, by calling 
1-800-210-2106 or by visiting your nearest Secretary 
of State facility.
o   Yes
o   No
Are you already a cadaveric organ donor?
*You can consult you Illinois Driver’s License to 
verify if you are a cadaveric organ donor
o   Yes
o   No
o   Do not know
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If answered no or do not know, respondents were 
asked the following:
Illinois Driver Incentive
 In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30 
fee when they get their driver’s license. With this in 
mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles 
was to waive your fee, only if you became an organ 
donor, would you then become an organ donor to 
cancel the $30 fee?
o   Yes
o   No
o   Do not know
If answered yes, respondents were asked the follow-
ing:
Illinois Driver Incentive-For Donors
 In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30 
fee when they get their driver’s license. With this in 
mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles 
was to waive your fee, only if you became an organ 
donor, would you have been more enticed to become 
an organ donor in order to cancel the $30 fee?
o   Yes
o   No
o   Do not know
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